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“These authors and a related commentary (Friston, 2009)
concluded that: i) The concepts of temporal precedence and G-
causality should not be used in fMRI connectivity analysis
(Roebroeck et al. 2011-this issue).”
First, I should say this was not the conclusion I wanted to convey.
Second, I apologize for the superﬁcial and dismissive treatment of
Granger causality in Friston (2009): I was asked to provide a ‘primer’
that focused speciﬁcally on the implications of David et al. (2009) for
non-specialists. This focus precluded a balanced discussion of
effective connectivity analyses. In contrast, Roebroeck et al. (2011-
this issue) provide a comprehensive and compelling treatment of the
essential issues; while companion papers (in this section) offer a
wider discussion on some of the conceptual and technical issues. In
light of these papers, I will limit my comments on Roebroeck et al. to
develop or nuance some of the key points they make.
The reservations articulated in Friston (2009) were not about
temporal precedence but about the vector autoregressive models
(VAR) on which G-causal inference is based. These reservations are
technical and formal: Technically, Granger causal analysis (GCA)
rests on the theory of Martingales, which requires random ﬂuctua-
tions in the brain to be inﬁnitely ‘rough’ (like white noise). Pedro
Valdes Sosa and I (Valdes-Sosa and Friston, 2011) discuss the
implications of this elsewhere. The formal reservations are based on
the form of VAR or linear stochastic models (LSM), reviewed nicely in
Roebroeck et al. These forms can preclude an interpretation of the
model parameters in terms of directed connectivity; I deal with this1053-8119 © 2009 Elsevier Inc.
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highlight.
Model comparison and selection
“Exploratory techniques, like GCM, use information in the data to
investigate the relative applicability of many models. As such,
they have the potential to detect ‘missing’ regions in structural
models. Conﬁrmatory approaches, like DCM, test hypotheses
about connectivity within a small set of models assumed to be
applicable (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
This is an important distinction and highlights the fact that DCM
is usually called upon, after an exploratory analysis, to answer
questions about the connectivity architectures that mediate ob-
served regional responses. These exploratory (whole brain) analyses
usually identify co-activated areas (with conventional SPM) or
sometimes use pychophysiological interactions (to identify regions
whose connections may show task-dependent changes). Granger
causality mapping (GCM) can play an important role in this
structural model selection. However, DCM is not usually considered
as a conﬁrmatory technique, because its primary use is in dynamic
model selection. Put simply, DCM is based on model comparison (of
the same sort used to infer G-Causality) that allows one to explore
model-space. Here, the models differ in their connections and
ensuing dynamics. It is now commonplace to explore model-spaces
with hundreds of models (e.g., Fairhall & Ishai 2007; Stephan et al.,
2007a). In this sense, DCM is exploratory. In model comparison,
models of the same data are compared in terms of their evidence
(this is the basis of Bayes-factors or log-odd ratios). The evidence is
simply the probability of the data given a model. The twist here is
that, in fMRI, the data change with the structural model, which
304 K. Friston / NeuroImage 58 (2011) 303–305means one cannot compare structural models with different regions
(with GCA or DCM). This makes structural model selection necessary
and mandates exploratory analyses. However, this only applies to
fMRI; in EEG and MEG, all data channels are used and it is perfectly
possible (and optimal) to select the structural model (in terms of
dipole number and location) using DCM (e.g., Garrido et al., 2008).
“In the model identiﬁcation stage the parameters in the chosen
model class are estimated from the observed data record. In
practice, model selection and identiﬁcation often occur in a
somewhat interactive fashion where, for instance, model selection
can be informed by the ﬁt of different models to the data achieved
in an identiﬁcation step. (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
This is an important point and highlights the distinction between
inference on models (i.e., Bayesian model comparison in DCM or
inferring G-causality using the accuracy of models with and without a
connection) and inference on unknown parameters of any given
model. Model comparison is based on the log-evidence for any model,
which comprises accuracy (i.e., ﬁt) and complexity (i.e., number of
parameters). In one sense, the ‘interaction’ between model selection
and identiﬁcation is part of model comparison; in that a model with
low ﬁt will have smaller evidence (Penny et al., 2004; Stephan et al.,
2009). Usually, in DCM one optimizes the model by an exhaustive
search of model-space (selecting the model with the greatest log-
evidence) and then reports the conditional parameter estimates of the
best model.
“The bias/variance trade-off in model ﬁtting dictates that over-
ﬁtting a ﬁnite dataset with too many parameters will lead to poor
generalization of model ﬁt to other data sets. Therefore, clear
justiﬁable choices must be made both in the structural model and
the dynamical model to keep the number of estimated parameters
in a suitable range. (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
In fact, proper model comparison (based on the evidence as
opposed to just the accuracy or ﬁt) prevents over-ﬁtting for free,
because the log-evidence includes a complexity term (Penny et al.,
2004). This means the selection of model-space is not constrained by
complexity considerations; if a model has too many parameters its
complexity will be high and the evidence will fall below a more
parsimonious (generalisable) model.
“The incapability of DCM to model signal variations beyond those
implied by the exogenous inputs makes its connectivity estima-
tion highly dependent on the exact number and form of the
assumed inputs and the form of the structural model (Roebroeck
et al., 2011-this issue).”
This is an important point; namely inference on parameters is
conditioned on (and depends on) the model. However, this depen-
dency may or may not be greater for deterministic DCMs (as opposed
to stochastic DCMs, which model random ﬂuctuations). This is an
empirical question that would be addressed using model comparison
(i.e., deterministic vs. stochastic formulations of the same DCM).
“Model selection procedures for connectivity should include
consideration of more than just a few brain structures…. The
clear danger with overly simple structural models is that of
spurious inﬂuence: an erroneous inﬂuence found between two
selected regions that in reality is due to interactions with
additional regions which have been ignored (Roebroeck et al.,
2011-this issue).”
Although an important issue, it is difﬁcult to substantiate general
statements of this sort. In fact, conditional estimates of effective
connectivity from a full graph (network) are often very consistentwith estimates based on subgraphs. This speaks to a common
misconception about DCM; namely, that one will get misleading
answers if key regions are omitted. This is not the case. Effective
connectivity is the ‘effective’ inﬂuence one region exerts over another
and can be mediated polysynaptically through other (omitted)
regions. This means it is perfectly possible (and common practice)
to focus on a small number of interconnected regions and use
exogenous inputs as surrogates for afferent input from other regions.Hemodynamic convolution
“Undoing the effect of hemodynamics on fMRI data (by
deconvolution) can be an important tool. However, it is crucially
dependent upon assumptions that need to be veriﬁed (Roebroeck
et al., 2011-this issue).”
This is absolutely right, in a qualiﬁed sense: DCM does not
deconvolve neuronal activity from hemodynamic signals and then
look for coupling among the ensuing estimates; it inverts or ﬁts a full
model of distributed neuronal responses that is equipped with
hemodynamics (i.e., a hemodynamic convolution). This means condi-
tional correlations among the neuronal (coupling) and hemodynamic
parameters are properly accounted for during inference. Note that
“David et al. performed deconvolution operations to obtain
estimates of neuronal source signals for their regions of interest
to use in G-causality analysis (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
They had to do this because the model used by GCA has no
hemodynamics. However, this deconvolution is not necessary in DCM;
it is implicit inmodel inversion. Crucially, DCM for fMRI uses regionally
speciﬁc hemodynamic parameters so that variations in hemodynamic
latency can explain away any spurious temporal precedence in
observed signals. This is expressed nicely in Roebroeck et al.:
“For instance, if there are delayed coherent variations between
variables in the observed data and the hemodynamic model has
muchmore affordance fordelays than theneurodynamicmodel (as is
the case in DCM), then the delay will be put into the hemodynamics
in the ﬁtting of the model (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
This ensures that regional hemodynamic variations do not
confound the estimation of neuronal coupling parameters. One
might think that one needs to know the exact form of the
hemodynamics that link neuronal activity to BOLD signals to estimate
neuronal parameters properly. In fact, as evidenced by model
comparison of the sort reported in Stephan et al. (2007b), this is not
the case: Any hemodynamic model with sufﬁcient degrees of freedom
will do; in the sense that the neuronal parameters are largely
unaffected by changing the form of the hemodynamic model. This
explains the success of conventional convolution models used in
whole-brain SPM analyses, which use linear mixtures of basis
functions. In brief, the only thing that matters is the generalized
convolution kernel of the optimized hemodynamic mapping, not the
form or parameterization of its underlying differential equations (of
course, this is not the case if one was interested in the physiology of
the hemodynamics per se; such as the effects of aging on vascular
compliance). In summary, while the detailed physiology of neuro-
vascular coupling is an active area of research and modeling, we
already knowmore than sufﬁcient to model it phenomenologically, in
that there is no evidence in fMRI data for more elaborate models
(Stephan et al., 2007b); at least to date.
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“We will argue that, rather, the important distinctions between
DCM and GCM are in a deterministic versus a stochastic dynamical
model and in the physical interpretation of its variables.…
Nonetheless, it will be informative to compare the class of Linear
Stochastic Models (LSM), of which the AR model used in GCM is a
special case, with the DCM signal model to see that their crucial
differences are actually subtle (Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue).”
This brings us to the formal problems with linear stochastic or
vector autoregression (VAR)models employed by GCA. The critique of
GCA in Friston (2009) was not directed at exploratory GCM (Granger
causality Mapping) with bivariate models (Goebel et al., 2003;
Roebroeck et al., 2005) but reﬂected our earlier assessment of
multivariate VAR models of networks (i.e., with three or more
regions; see Harrison et al., 2003 and Fig. 1 in Friston 2009). The
problem can be illustrated in terms of the relationship between linear
stochastic equations and the equations of motion used by DCM (see
Fig. 2 in Roebroeck et al., 2011-this issue). In brief, a (stochastic) DCM
can always be formulated as a VAR model, which takes the following
form (ignoring exogenous inputs and observables):
z ̇ tð Þ = Az tð Þ + η tð ÞZ z tð Þ = Az t − 1ð Þ + e tð ÞA = exp Að Þ
(where ɛ(t) is a complicated convolution of the innovation η(t); see
Valdes-Sosa et al., 2009). However, the converse is not true. In other
words, there is no necessary mapping between the parameters of a
VAR model (the autoregression coefﬁcients A∈ℜn× n) and the
coupling parameters (effective connectivity A∈ℜn×n) that mediate
the inﬂuence of one state over another. In other words, the effective
connectivity associated with the VAR coefﬁcients does not necessarily
exist; more formally A=ln(A)∈ℜn×n when, and only when, all the
real eigenvalues of A are positive. The problems caused by the
mapping A=exp(A) can be illustrated quite simply by considering
the coupling among three regions, where there is no connection from
the second to the ﬁrst, e.g.,
A =
−1 0 −:5
:5 −1 −:5
:5 :5 −1
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4
3
5ZA=
:3164 −:044 −:169
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Critically, the VAR parameters suggest that the ﬁrst two areas are
reciprocally connected; e.g., A12=− .044. This means that that testsfor the existence of the VAR (G-causal) parameter A12 do not test for
the corresponding directed connection A12=0. This problem becomes
greater with longer time intervals (i.e., TR) between observations,
which we assume is one, for convenience.
Happily, bivariate models are exempt from this problem, because
the VAR coefﬁcient associated with an absent connection is always
zero, e.g.,
A = −1 0
:5 −1
 
ZA = :3679 0
:1839 :3679
 
This admits their qualiﬁed use to detect directed pair-wise coupling,
as described in Goebel et al. (2003) and Roebroeck et al. (2005).
In short, there is a formal and fundamental divorce between the
forms of networkmodels used by DCM and VAR. This divorce becomes
even more acute when we consider high order VAR(p) models. These
are requiredwhen the number of hidden states exceeds the number of
observed data points, as in two-statemodels for fMRI (Marreiros et al.,
2008). At this point, we move beyond the issues considered by
Roebroeck et al. (2011-this issue) and so I will close, in the hope that
the comments above supplement their useful and informed review.
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